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The initial period of vaccination shows strong heterogeneity between countries’ vaccinations 
rollout, both in the terms of the start of the vaccination process and in the dynamics of the 
number of people that are vaccinated. A predominant thesis in the ongoing debate on the 
drivers of this observed heterogeneity is that a key determinant of the swift and extensive 
vaccine rollout is state capacity. Here, we utilize two measures that quantify different aspects 
of the state capacity: i) the external capacity (measured through the soft power and the 
economic power of the country) and ii) the internal capacity (measured via the country’s 
government effectiveness) and investigate their relationship with the coronavirus vaccination 
outcome in the initial period (up to 30th January 2021). By using data on 189 countries and a 
two-step Heckman approach, we find that the economic power of the country and its soft power 
are robust determinants of whether a country has started with the vaccination process. In 
addition, the government effectiveness is a key factor that determines vaccine roll-out. 
Altogether, our findings are in line with the hypothesis that state capacity determines the 
observed heterogeneity between countries in the initial period of COVID-19 vaccines rollout. 
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The COVID-19 virus created the most severe global economic crisis since the Global 
Depression. The recent innovation of COVID-19 vaccines brings hope that the World will exit 
from the pandemic soon. As a means to provide an equitable access to vaccines for every 
country, the World Health Organization created the COVAX system. However, the system has 
so far failed in its goal, and the initial period of vaccination shows strong heterogeneity between 
countries’ vaccinations rollouts. This is observed both in the terms of the start of the 
vaccination process and in the dynamics of the number of people that are vaccinated. 
Concretely, until end-January 2021, the vaccination started only in 54 countries in the World, 
while the COVID-19 vaccines are not accessible for most of the countries. Also, there are high 
discrepancies among the countries in speed of vaccination. Israel is leading with 46,7 
administered COVID-19 doses per 100 people, followed by United Arab Emirates 27.1, United 
Kingdom 10.8 and United States 7.1, while the rest of the countries are below 5 administered 
COVID-19 doses per 100 people on January 30th, 2021.1  
A predominant thesis in the ongoing debate on the drivers of this heterogeneity is that a key 
determinant of the swift and extensive vaccine rollout is state capacity. This variable is not 
strictly defined in the literature but is generally portrayed as a potential source of strength that 
can fundamentally shape the implementation and the final impact of policies (Cingolani et al. 
2015). As such it has attracted renowned interest in studies of economic development over the 
past decade (for example, Besley and Persson 2010, Acemoglu et al. 2015, Cingolani 2018, 
Khemani 2019, Williams 2020).  
In our work, we bridge the gap between the theoretical debate and empirical evidence by 
conducting a thorough econometric analysis on the impact of state capacity on the ability of a 
country to start and implement the vaccination process. For this purpose, we utilize country 
level data that covers the initial period of the vaccination process, up to January 30th, 2021 and 
model the final outcome (the total number of administered vaccines per capita at the final date). 
Evidently, the data is censored i.e., most countries display 0 vaccination rate. To circumvent 
this problem, we assume that countries undergo a process of negotiation with vaccine providers 
and accept an offer only if it suits their economy. This allows us to describe the vaccination 
outcome as a two-step Heckman selection model. In the first step, we model the probability 
that a country has started with the vaccination process by using all available data. In the second 
step, we model the vaccination rate only for the countries that have started with the vaccination 
process. 
We follow the literature and view the importance of the state capacity in two dimensions that 
determines COVID-19 vaccination success. The first is external capacity which describes the 
ability of the state to influence outcomes outside of its territory. In this case, it determines the 
likelihood that the country will secure reception of vaccines in a time period when vaccine 
supply is much lower than demand (i.e., a non-censored observation).  The second is the 
internal state capacity. The internal capacity is relevant after the vaccines are received and it 
determines the speed of vaccination among a country's population.  
The impact of the external state capacity on the supply of vaccines is based on the economic 
power and soft power of the country. As an approximation for economic power, we use the 
total GDP of the country. In the gravity models of international trade, this observable represents 
economic mass and is seen as a crude measure of economic power. An additional similar 
measure can be the export of the country, which is an indicator of the success of an economy 
in international trade. Nye (2004) defines soft power as the capacity for shaping the preferences 
of others through appeal and cooperation. While there is no widely accepted measure of the 
soft power and different rankings focused on different elements of interest, in this paper, we 
use the membership of the country in the top 30 countries according to the Soft Power 30 index 
(USC Center of Public Diplomacy, 2020). This is a formal index that ranks countries according 
to three primary dimensions of soft power: culture, political values and foreign policy, based 
on theoretical considerations of Nye (2011). For various applications of the index, we refer to 
Rutland and Kazantsev 2016, Lai 2019, and Kacziba 2020.   
We measure the internal state capacity with the World Bank’s indicator of government 
effectiveness. The indicator captures perception about the quality of policies formulation and 
implementation. As a consequence, it has been widely used as an indicator of the administrative 
capacity (for example, Lee and Whitford 2009, Hanson and Sigman 2013).  
 
1 Source: Ourworld in data, https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations. 
After controlling for a large set of potential socio-economic and COVID-19 specific 
confounders, we find that the economic power of the country and its soft power are robust 
determinants of the vaccines receipts and start of the vaccination process in the initial period, 
which is characterized with very limited vaccines supply from producers. In addition, our 
results suggest that after the vaccines’ supply is secured, the internal state capacity, measured 
by the government effectiveness, is a key factor that determines vaccine roll-out. Altogether, 
our findings are in line with the hypothesis that state capacity determines the observed 
heterogeneity between countries in the initial period of COVID-19 vaccines rollout.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present an econometric model. 
In Section 3 we describe the data used for the testing of our hypotheses. In Section 4 we present 




Countries undergo a process of negotiation with a vaccine provider to determine the quantity 
and price of vaccines. This process involves a great deal of geopolitics and, in the sense that 
most of the countries negotiate only with vaccine providers which are recognized by its 
geopolitical allies. This is evident by the fact that many countries from Eastern Europe in the 
observed period declined offers of Sinovac from China or Sputnic V from Russia, while failed 
to secure Western vaccines made by BioNTech-Pfizer, Moderna and AstraZeneca.2 In addition, 
there might be skepticism in the quality of certain vaccines. For simplicity we assume that these 
aspects are translated in the price of the vaccine. The resulting outcome for country 𝑖 is the 
offer for the number of vaccinations per hundred population 𝑣!
∗, which is unobserved. If the 
offer is above a certain threshold that is acceptable for the price, the country will accept the 
offer. Moreover, the start of vaccination is conditioned with physical distribution of the 
vaccines in the observed period.3 Evidently, there is a bias in the selection of the sample 
countries used for modeling the COVID-19 vaccination dynamics, as not everyone was able to 
efficiently negotiate with vaccine providers and to secure receipt of the vaccines. 
A simple way to correct for this bias is to utilize a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1974; 
Winship, 1992). The model represents a simple two-step approach. In the first step of the 
estimation procedure, the researcher models the sampling probability of each observation. In 
our case, this is the selection equation, where we quantify the probability that a certain country 
has started with the vaccination process. This is modeled as a probit regression of the form 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉! = 1	|𝑋#! , 𝑍#!) = 𝛷(𝛽#𝑋#! + 𝛾𝑍#!),	
 
where 𝑉! is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if country 𝑖 has started with the vaccination 
process, and zero otherwise; 𝑋#! is a vector of potential socio-economic variables that 
determine the value of 𝑉!, with 𝛽# being their marginal effects; and 𝑍#! 	are control variables 
that are specific to the COVID-19 dynamics in the country, with 𝛾 being their marginal effect.  
The second step models the observed vaccination rate by correcting the bias in the random 
error 𝑢! of the regression using the conditional expectation of the error estimated in the first 
step. Formally, the second step of the equation is specified as 
 
𝐸(𝑣!|	𝑋$! , 𝑍$! , 𝑉! = 1) = 	𝛽$𝑋$! + 𝛿𝑍$! + 𝐸(𝑢!|𝛽$𝑋$! + 𝛿𝑍$!). 
 
2 See the report accessed at https://ecfr.eu/article/the-geopolitics-of-covid-vaccines-in-europes-eastern-
neighbourhood/  
3 In order to force pharmaceutical companies to fulfil COVID-19 contracts, European Union has introduced a 
temporary export regime for COVID-19 vaccines on January 30th, 2021.  
 
In the equation, 𝑋$! is a vector of potential socio-economic variables that determine the 
vaccination rate of a country which has started the vaccination process, with 𝛽$ being their 
marginal effects; and 𝑍$! are control variables that are specific to the vaccination rate dynamics 




We obtained COVID-19 number of vaccinations per hundred population data from Our World 
in Data in Data – Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations database4. The explanatory variables 
were taken from various sources, as will be explained in the following. For each variable, unless 
otherwise specified, we take the last available data point as our observation, with the note that 
we do not take data that came out after January 30th 2021. This is because we want to emphasize 
the role of the country's capacity in being able to deliver COVID-19 vaccines in the initial 
period of the vaccination process. 
In the first step of the model specification, we include two control variables that may govern 
the probability that a country has started with the vaccination process. They are the log of the 
registered COVID-19 cases up to the last date of observation and the log of the average daily 
government response index since the first registered case and up to the last date of observation. 
The first variable quantifies the magnitude of the health crisis in the country, whereas the 
second one is an estimate for the government behavior aimed at reducing the impact of the 
crisis. The data for the registered Cases were taken from the Our World in Data Coronavirus 
database5. The government response index was calculated using the methodology described in 
(Stojkoski et al., 2020) with input data from the Oxford Government Response Tracker6. In 
addition, the socio-economic variables that may drive the observation of whether a country has 
started with the vaccination process and are included in our model are: the log of the GDP of 
the country – measures the size of the economy and its economic power; the log of the share 
of exports in GDP – quantifies the presence of the country in the global trade market; the log 
of the total health expenditures as a percent of GDP – provides an proxy for the capacity of the 
health sector in the country, the log of the Military expenditures as a percent of GDP – 
determines the hard power of the country, and a dummy quantifying whether the country is 
included in the top 30 countries that are ranked in terms of soft power – obviously, measuring 
the soft power of the country.  
In the second step, besides the control variables included in the first step we also include the 
number of days since the first vaccination in the country and dummies for three different types 
of vaccine providers present in the country i) Western block vaccines (Oxford/Az, 
Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna), ii) Chinese vaccines (Sino-Wuhan) and iii) Russian vaccines 
(Sputnik). The first quantity is a measure for the duration of the vaccination process in the 
country, whereas the second one is an approximation for the heterogeneity in the vaccine 
choices of a country and indirectly it may be a quantity for the geopolitical orientation of the 
country. Moreover, in the second step we include each of the socio-economic variables except 
the soft power dummy, which is now substituted with our measure for the internal capacity of 
the country – the government effectiveness. Also, we include the log of the share of persons 
above 65 years of age in the total population of the country. We expect that countries with older 
populations also speed up with the vaccination process as they are the most succeptible group 
 
4 Available at https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations. 
5 Available at https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus. 
6 Available at https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-government-response-tracker. 
to the disease. Data sources, variable descriptions and their abbreviations are presented in more 
detail in Appendix, Table A1. 
Column 1 of Table 1 gives the mean value for each variable included in the sample. Columns 
2 and 3 of the same table, give the summary statistics divided by group of countries which 
respectively have started and have not yet started the vaccination process. In total, only 56 of 
the 189 countries included in the sample have started with the vaccination process. 
Interestingly, the countries which started with the vaccination process also reported a higher 
number of registered cases per capita and had a stricter government response. Moreover, they 
had higher GDP, larger exports as well as health and military expenditures as a percent of GDP, 
older population and had more efficient government. All of this suggests that there are 
significant discrepancies in the economic performance of the countries which started with the 
vaccination process and those that have not. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable All countries 
Started vaccination 
No Yes 
Vaccinations p.h.p (log) 0.55 / 0.55 
  (1.57) / (1.57) 
COVID-19 cases p.m.p (log) 8.47 7.75 10.21 
  (2.31) (2.28) (1.17) 
Days (first vaccine - last vaccine) 27.11 / 27.11 
  (10.24) / (10.24) 
Government response (log) 57.22 56.83 58 
  (11.56) (12.76) (8.70) 
GDP (log) 25.05 24.32 26.67 
  (2.24) (2.04) (1.76) 
GDP per capita, PPP (log) 9.41 8.92 10.49 
  (1.16) (1.02) (0.61) 
Exports (% of GDP, log) 3.57 3.45 3.84 
  (0.61) (0.58) (0.61) 
Health expenditures (% of GDP, log) 1.77 1.69 1.97 
  (0.43) (0.44) (0.36) 
Military expenditures (% of GDP, log) 0.39 0.33 0.51 
  (0.92) (1.03) (0.67) 
Government effectiveness -0.05 -0.43 0.83 
  (0.99) (0.84) (0.74) 
Population 65+ (log) 0.55 0.41 0.86 
  (0.46) (0.38) (0.48) 
Number of countries 189 133 56 






4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
We begin the analysis with a graphical representation of the association between the economic 
power and the probability for the country to start with the vaccination process in the initial 
period (December 15th 2020 - January 30th 2021). In this aspect, Figure 1 compares the boxplot 
of the log of GDP of the countries that started with the vaccination with the boxplot of the log 
of GDP of the countries that did not start in the observed period. The group of countries that 
started the vaccination process not only have a higher median, minimum and maximum, but 
also its first quartile is almost equal to the third quartile of the group of countries that did not 

















Figure 1. Boxplots based on GDP.  
 
In more detail in Figure 2 we present with dots all 189 studied countries. Also, we plot the 
conditional probability density that a country started vaccination, given its GDP (in logs). The 
line shows that higher values of GDP lead to an increase in the probability that a country starts 
the vaccination process. Moreover, on this figure the countries that are in top 30 countries 
according to soft power are marked with orange. The vaccination started in 87% of the 
countries that are members of the Soft power 30. The four top soft power 30 countries where 
vaccinations did not start are characterized with low levels of daily COVID-19 cases (they are 


















Figure 2. Conditional probability density for a country to start the vaccination process 
given its GDP. The filled background color indicates the 95% confidence interval. 
 
In Figure 3, we present a scatterplot between government effectiveness and vaccination rate 
for all 56 countries that started with vaccination in the observed period. The plot uncovers a 
positive relationship between observed variables, implying that countries with higher 


















Figure 3. Relationship between government effectiveness and vaccination rate. The line 
shows the linear relationship between the variables (significant at 1%). 
 
4.2 Heckman selection model results 
 
Mirroring our theoretical model, the empirical analysis follows the described two-step 
process. In the first step, we quantify the probability for the start of the vaccination process in 
the observed period. The second step models the observed vaccination rate. 
The results of the Heckman selection model are presented in Table 2. Columns (1-2) give 
the model estimates with only the control variables included in the model, Columns 3-12, 
represent results with four different specifications for the COVID-19 vaccination process. In 
each model, the dependent variable of the first step is marked with started, while in the second 
step with lvac. The estimated coefficients of the first model, as given in Columns 1 and 2 show 
that the registered COVID-19 cases are significant in both steps and that the number of days 
since the start of vaccination is significant in the second step, while the government response 
index is not significant. The positive coefficients imply that more registered COVID-19 cases 
in the country increases the probability country to start with the vaccinations in the observed 
period and also that more registered COVID-19 cases speed up the vaccination rate in the 
observed period. Also, as expected, more days since the start of vaccination lead to higher 
vaccination rate. 
In the second model, given in Columns 3-4 of the same table, we add our measures of soft 
country capacity to the estimation. The results reveal that the country’s membership in the top 
30 soft power increases the probability that the country received vaccines and started with the 
vaccinations in the observed period. Also, the positive and significant government 
effectiveness coefficient implies that higher government effectiveness leads to higher 
vaccination rate in the country.  
The third model (Columns 5-6) includes additional variables in both steps in order to check 
whether the capacity of the health sector or military power of the country influences the 
vaccination process. The estimated coefficients show that the capacity of the health sector in 
the country (the log of the total health expenditures as a percent of GDP) and the hard power 
of the country (the log of the military expenditures as a percent of GDP) are not significant 
determinants of the probability country to started with vaccination in observed period, while 
the soft power is still significant and positive. Similarly, these additionally added variables do 
not display a significant effect on the vaccination rate in the country. 
The fourth model (Columns 7-8) is augmented with economic and demographic variables. 
In the first step, it additionally includes the log of the GDP and the log of the share of exports 
in GDP, while in the second step it additionally includes log of the GDP and share of the 
population above 65-years as the riskiest population group. The estimated coefficients in the 
first step show that both economic variables are significant and positive, implying that the size 
of the economy and the presence of the country in the international trade matter for both the 
probability that the country started with the vaccination process and the speed with which it 
distributes. Also, the soft power remains positive and significant. Additionally, the estimated 
coefficients in the second step show that the size of the economy and the share of the population 
above 65 years age are not significant, as well as previously added variables, while the days 
since the start of vaccination and government effectiveness remains significant and positive. 
The estimated coefficients in each of the Heckman selection models back our theoretical 
claims. In every case, the economic power increases the probability that a country will secure 
the receipt of vaccines in the initial period of the start of vaccination.  The bigger size of the 
economy represents a bigger market for the vaccine supplier and gives the country a better 
negotiation position. Also, stronger relative export capacity of the economy represents more 
importance in international trade and improves the prospects of the country to receive vaccines. 
Moreover, economic power is not a sole determinant of vaccine receipt, but also the soft power 
matters. We argue that the reason for this is not only limited supply of the vaccines in the period 
from December 15th 2020 to January 30th 2021, but also the fact that the competition for 
vaccines is not between private subjects, but between governments, which use their diplomatic 
and other apparatus. In addition, it is important to note that more registered COVID-19 cases 
mean more pressure on governments to find a way to secure the vaccines receipt in the initial 
period. Similarly, once the vaccines are secured, the speed of the vaccination depends on the 
government effectiveness to organize and execute the process of vaccinations, as well as the 
time of the realization of the process.  
In the last model, we substitute the total GDP of the country with the GDP per capita and use 
it to check the significance of the predictors. In this case, the soft power variable is again a 
positive and significant predictor of the start of the vaccination, together with the number of 
registered COVID-19 cases and GDP per capita, which is an alternative measure of the 
economic power of the country, while the other variables remain not significant as in the 
previous models. In the second step, we observe that a significant predictor of the vaccination 
rate is only the number of the days since the first start of vaccination, whereas the newly 
included GDP per capita and the only variable that was previously significant, the government 
effectiveness, are not able to explain the COVID-19 vaccination dynamics together. However, 
the lost significance of the government effectiveness can be explained with high correlation 
between GDP per capita and government effectiveness (0.83). In Figure A1 in the appendix, 
we present a correlation matrix between all included variables in the analysis.    
 
Table 2: Estimated Heckman selection models for the vaccination process. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 






























           
cases (log) 0.361** 0.525*** 0.297** 0.504*** 0.315*** 0.567*** 0.304** 0.469*** 0.254** 0.387** 
 (0.165) (0.130) (0.123) (0.096) (0.121) (0.145) (0.146) (0.120) (0.128) (0.150) 
days 0.087***  0.069***  0.085***  0.071***  0.068***  
 (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.019)  
gov_response 
(log) 
-0.900 -0.452   -0.889 -0.205 -0.356 0.086 -0.502 0.021 
 (1.276) (0.517)   (1.232) (0.716) (1.287) (0.818) (1.334) (0.750) 
GDP (log)       -0.178 0.400***   
       (0.199) (0.127)   
gdp_ppp_pc 
(log) 
        0.574 0.737*** 
         (0.697) (0.281) 
exports (log)      0.320  1.090***  -0.022 
      (0.309)  (0.378)  (0.344) 
health_exp 
(log) 
    -0.328 -0.521 0.037 0.044 -0.439 -0.323 
     (0.560) (0.515) (0.819) (0.555) (0.543) (0.599) 
military_exp 
(log) 
    0.239 0.180 0.281 -0.005 0.245 0.124 
     (0.267) (0.193) (0.215) (0.202) (0.233) (0.177) 
gov_eff   0.718***    0.782***  0.335  
   (0.217)    (0.255)  (0.525)  
pop_65 (log)       -0.221  -0.003  
       (0.427)  (0.406)  
Soft Power 30    2.129***  2.337***  1.224**  1.286*** 
    (0.352)  (0.435)  (0.487)  (0.368) 
Constant -2.022 -3.408* -5.120*** -5.538*** -0.878 -5.519 1.746 -19.707*** -6.979 -10.902** 
 (5.632) (1.872) (1.213) (0.935) (5.597) (3.423) (10.182) (6.337) (6.517) (4.322) 
           
Observations 165 165 187 187 151 151 148 148 148 148 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Every model includes dummies for the three types of vaccines i) Western block, ii) Chinese 
and iii) Russian. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
In Tables 3 and 4 we test the robustness of our results by performing two series of outliers 
check. In particular, in Table 3 we remove the countries that are below the 5th and above the 
95th percentile in terms of the magnitude of government effectiveness and GDP, whereas in 
Table 4 we remove the countries that are above the 95th percentile in terms of the observed 
vaccination rate up until January 30th. In both cases, we repeat the estimation of the first four 
models discussed above, and each time our measures of soft power and external capacity 
remain significant predictors with a positive magnitude of, respectively, the probability that a 
country will start with the vaccination process and the vaccination rate in the initial period. 
Hence, our results are robust against the presence of outliers. 
 




 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 





















         
cases (log) 0.518* 0.821*** 0.113 0.692*** 0.711* 0.600*** 0.228 0.504*** 
 (0.309) (0.169) (0.316) (0.143) (0.383) (0.160) (0.487) (0.136) 
days 0.083***  0.065***  0.070**  0.063**  
 (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.035)  (0.028)  
gov_response 
(log) 
-1.642 -0.618   -1.537 -0.187 -0.824 0.120 
 (1.788) (0.704)   (1.656) (0.808) (1.749) (0.915) 
GDP (log)       -0.243 0.313** 
       (0.237) (0.140) 
exports (log)      0.667  1.284** 
      (0.460)  (0.561) 
health_exp (log)     -1.575* 0.214 -1.134 0.560 
     (0.957) (0.594) (1.413) (0.680) 
military_exp 
(log) 
    0.040 0.333 0.040 0.159 
     (0.347) (0.240) (0.258) (0.231) 
gov_eff   1.405***    1.447***  
   (0.454)    (0.535)  
pop_65 (log)       -0.166  
       (0.473)  
Soft Power 30    1.735***  1.599***  0.879* 
    (0.307)  (0.355)  (0.525) 
Constant -1.209 -5.795* -3.442 -7.327*** 0.834 -8.669* 8.852 -19.759** 
 (9.037) (2.998) (3.466) (1.443) (9.224) (4.832) (13.238) (8.104) 
         
Observations 131 131 142 142 123 123 123 123 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Every model includes dummies for the three types of vaccines i) Western block, ii) 
Chinese and iii) Russian. 












Table 4: Estimated Heckman selection models (vaccination rate outliers excluded). 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 





















         
cases (log) 0.425*** 0.516*** 0.290*** 0.496*** 0.284** 0.556*** 0.331*** 0.488*** 
 (0.145) (0.130) (0.105) (0.099) (0.115) (0.142) (0.092) (0.125) 
days 0.088***  0.070***  0.079***  0.064***  
 (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.017)  
gov_response 
(log) 
-0.490 -0.403   -0.250 -0.084 1.091 0.242 
 (1.081) (0.511)   (1.017) (0.732) (0.982) (0.881) 
GDP (log)       0.042 0.498*** 
       (0.101) (0.118) 
exports (log)      0.276  1.163** 
      (0.298)  (0.454) 
health_exp (log)     0.195 -0.497 -0.583 0.107 
     (0.473) (0.518) (0.591) (0.605) 
military_exp 
(log) 
    0.076 0.158 0.265 -0.020 
     (0.199) (0.202) (0.161) (0.215) 
gov_eff   0.573***    0.519**  
   (0.182)    (0.217)  
pop_65 (log)       0.633**  
       (0.315)  
Soft Power 30    2.197***  2.407***  1.191** 
    (0.352)  (0.416)  (0.488) 
Constant -4.431 -3.545* -4.660*** -5.526*** -3.570 -5.856 -11.672** -23.542*** 
 (4.492) (1.870) (1.063) (0.966) (4.507) (3.602) (5.432) (6.985) 
         
Observations 162 162 184 184 148 148 145 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Every model includes dummies for the three types of vaccines i) Western block, ii) 
Chinese and iii) Russian. 





We investigated the potential impact of state capacity on the ability of a country to start 
and implement the vaccination process in the initial COVID-19 vaccination period from 
December 15th 2020 to January 30th 2021. This was done by considering variables that can 
determine the likelihood that the country will secure reception of vaccines in a time period 
when vaccine supply is much lower than demand, as well as the variables that possibly affect 
the speed of the vaccination once the vaccines are received. By utilizing a Heckman two-step 
selection approach, in the first step, we quantified the probability for a certain country to start 
with the vaccination process in the observed period, based on the sample of 189 countries. In 
the second step, we modeled the observed vaccination rate in the countries that started with 
vaccination. The results of the model showed that economic power increases the probability 
that a country will secure the receipt of vaccines in the initial period of the start of vaccination. 
However, this is not the sole determinant, and the soft power of a country also matters. 
Moreover, once the vaccines are secured, we found that the speed of the vaccination is related 
with the government’s effectiveness to organize and execute the process of vaccinations, as 
well as the time of the realization of the process. On the other hand, the country’s policy 
response, total health expenditures, military expenditures, and proportion of the population 
above 65 years age are not significant. We also performed robustness checks, which were in 
line with the baseline results. 
These results put a new light on the already known wisdom that the role of the state is crucial 
in a severe crisis, such as world wars, systemic economic crisis and pandemics. This particular 
time, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the vaccine rollout is a game changer as it reduces the 
health risks and directly impacts the speed and extent of economic recovery. Therefore, all 
countries around the world entered in a strong competition for vaccine receipt and 
implementation of the vaccination process in the initial period, which was characterized also 
by the non-functioning of the COVAX system, the global response system which was created 
with the aim to secure fair distribution of the vaccines in the countries around the world. In this 
aspect, the results of this paper are a stark reminder for the need for transparent and fair global 
response regarding fair and equitable availability of vaccines to every country.  
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Table A1: Data sources and description of variables. 
 
Variable Code Definition Data Source Note 
COVID-19 cases p.m.p cases 
Confirmed COVID-19 cases per million 
population 




Started vaccination / 
Indication whether the country has started 
with the vaccination procedure. 
Our World in Data, 
Coronavirus Binary 
Vaccinations p.h.p / 
COVID-19 vaccination does administered 
per hundred people 




Government response gov_response 
Oxford's daily government response index 
measures the variation in daily 









Number of days between the first vaccine 
and last available data for vaccinations 
p.h.p. 




GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products.  WDI, World Bank 
Measured in 
logs 
GDP per capita, PPP 
gdp_pc_ppp 
This indicator provides per capita values 
for gross domestic product (GDP) 
expressed in current international dollars 
converted by purchasing power parity 
(PPP) conversion factor. WDI, World Bank 
Measured in 
logs 
Exports (% of GDP) 
exports 
Exports of goods and services represent 
the value of all goods and other market 
services provided to the rest of the world. WDI, World Bank 
Measured in 
logs 
Health expenditures (% 
of GDP) health_exp 
Level of current health expenditure 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. WDI, World Bank 
Measured in 
logs 
Military expenditures (% 
of GDP) 
military_exp 
Military expenditures data from SIPRI are 
derived from the NATO definition, which 
includes all current and capital 






Captures perceptions of the quality of 
public services, civil 
service and the degree of its independence 
from political 
pressures, quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and credibility of the 
government WGI, World Bank  
Population (65+, % of 
total) pop_65 
Population ages 65 and above as a 
percentage of the total population.  WDI, World Bank 
Measured in 
logs 
Soft Power 30 
/ 
Soft power is the ability to attract and co-
opt, rather than coerce (in contrast to hard 







Figure A1. Correlation matrix between the studied variables. 
 
